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code logs -> 2023 -> Wed, 01 Mar 2023 | < code.20230228.log - code.20230302.log > |
--- Log opened Wed Mar 01 00:00:33 2023 |
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03:27 | <@macdjord> | Alek: That article is based on cracking password hashes; the comic its referencing explicitly says its estimating cracking times based on someone sending guessed passwords to a remote service. |
03:29 | <@macdjord> | It is alsow flat out wrong in claiming xkcd ties the security to the number of characters. It assigns each randomly chosen word 11 bits of entropy, i.e. a word selected from a list of ~2048 common words. |
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21:41 | < FLHerne> | It probably does have a point that human "random" selection isn't random enough |
21:45 | < FLHerne> | basing timing estimates on hashing seems reasonable to me - that's probably the main attack surface against non-trivially-stupid passwords, pretty much any service will have enough rate-limiting to protect all but the very weakest |
21:45 | < FLHerne> | and people haven't stopped linking correcthorsebatterystaple so evaluating it against 2023's threats makes sense |
21:46 | < FLHerne> | my reading is still that the approach is reasonable, given a big enough word list and truly random selection |
21:56 | < Mahal> | the point of correct horse battery staple is that people _understand_ it |
21:56 | < Mahal> | yes, it may not be entirely technically correct in 2023 but the concept is really clearly laid out |
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--- Log closed Thu Mar 02 00:00:34 2023 |
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code logs -> 2023 -> Wed, 01 Mar 2023 | < code.20230228.log - code.20230302.log > |
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